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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued five
precedential trademark decisions—a slight decline from the seven
precedential decisions issued in 2018. The cases consist of appeals from
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB or “the Board”), U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC or “the Commission”), and a U.S.
district court. The majority of these decisions involved the issue of
likelihood of confusion and were resolved based on longstanding
precedent. The Federal Circuit also issued one notable decision relating
to the requirements for specimens of use consisting of webpages.

* Stephanie H. Bald is a Partner at Kelly IP, LLP, in Washington, D.C. and an
alumna of American University, Washington College of Law (WCL). She also serves as an Adjunct
Professor at WCL, where she teaches a course on trademark practice and procedure.
** Sara Copeland Parker is an Associate at Kelly, IP, LLP in Washington, D.C. She
specializes in trademark litigation before the federal courts and the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board.
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Each of the Federal Circuit’s precedential 2019 trademark decisions
is discussed in detail below.
I. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
A. In re Guild Mortg. Co.
In In re Guild Mortgage Co.,1 the Federal Circuit vacated the TTAB’s
decision that a likelihood of confusion existed between the mark
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY & Design (shown below) and the
word mark GUILD INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT.2
Figure 1: Guild Mortgage Co. Mark

Guild Mortgage Company (“Applicant”) applied to register the mark
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY & Design for “mortgage banking
services, namely, origination, acquisition, servicing, securitization and
brokerage of mortgage loans.”3 The examining attorney refused
registration based on a likelihood of confusion with Guild Investment
Management’s (“Registrant”) prior registration for the word mark
GUILD INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT for “investment advisory
services,” stating that the marks, nature of the services, and trade
channels were similar.4 The TTAB affirmed, noting that these
similarities were sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion even
though consumers “may exercise a certain degree of care in investing
money, if not perhaps in seeking a mortgage loan.”5
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Applicant argued that the Board
failed to consider relevant evidence as to concurrent use of the marks
without evidence of actual confusion, i.e., evidence directed to the
eighth Dupont factor of the thirteen-factor test for likelihood of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

912 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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confusion.6 Applicant presented evidence by way of a declaration from
its president and CEO that it had coexisted with Registrant for over
forty years without any evidence of actual confusion.7 The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) argued that the Board need not have addressed
this argument because “‘uncorroborated statements of no known instances
of actual confusion’ of the only party involved in the case are ‘of little
evidentiary value.’”8 The PTO also contended, during oral argument, that
evidence related to the eighth DuPont factor was “irrelevant.”9
The Federal Circuit held that the Board erred in failing to mention
this factor or address Applicant’s arguments about coexistence.10 The
Federal Circuit cited its precedent that the thirteen DuPont factors
“must be considered” “when [they] are of record.”11 The Federal
Circuit further noted that the consideration of coexistence with no
evidence of actual confusion (the eighth DuPont factor) is a separate
inquiry from the nature and extent of any actual confusion (the
seventh DuPont factor) and thus remanded for the Board to address
Applicant’s evidence of coexistence and reconsider its likelihood of
confusion determination.12
B. VersaTop Support Systems, LLC v. Georgia Expo, Inc.
In VersaTop Support Systems, LLC v. Georgia Expo., Inc.,13 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion on summary judgment that
a drape and rod company did not infringe its competitor’s trademarks.14
Georgia Expo and VersaTop are competing drape and rod
companies. VersaTop sells a “ball and crown” coupler under the marks
PIPE & DRAPE 2.0 and 2.0.15 Georgia Expo distributed advertising and
brochures that contained PIPE & DRAPE 2.0 next to pictures of the
VersaTop coupler.16

6. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(creating the thirteen-factor test for determining likelihood of consumer confusion).
7. In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d at 1379–80.
8. Id. at 1380 (quoting In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1381.
11. Id. at 1379 (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
12. Id. at 1380–81 (citing In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d at 1317).
13. 921 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
14. Id. at 1372.
15. Id. at 1366.
16. Id.
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The district court held on summary judgment that because Georgia
Expo had not “affixed” the trademarks to goods that were sold or
transported in commerce, it had not violated the Lanham Act.17 The
district court cited 15 U.S.C. § 1127, which states that “use in
commerce” requires the mark to be placed on the goods or their
containers and that the goods be sold or transported in commerce.18
The district court concluded that “no remedy [was] available for
Georgia Expo’s uses of VersaTop’s trademarks.”19
Applying Ninth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit noted that § 1127’s
definition of “use in commerce” applies “to the required use a plaintiff
must make in order to have rights in a mark,” not to prove infringement.20
The Federal Circuit then analyzed the likelihood of confusion
factors, noting that Georgia Expo had made no argument regarding
the similarity of the marks, goods, or trade channels.21 Rather, Georgia
Expo had argued only that no evidence of actual confusion existed.22
The Federal Circuit held that the failure to prove instances of
confusion was not dispositive, and the evidence was “clear and tilts
heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion” because the marks were
identical, the goods were related, and the marketing channels
overlapped.23 The Federal Circuit thus concluded as a matter of law
that Georgia Expo had infringed VersaTop’s trademarks, reversed the
district court’s judgment in favor of Georgia Expo, and remanded the
case for any appropriate further proceedings.24
C. Swagway, LLC v. ITC
25

In Swagway, LLC, the Federal Court affirmed the ITC’s conclusion
that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks SWAGWAY
X1 and X2 and SWAGTRON T1 and T3 for hoverboard products, on
the one hand, and the marks SEGWAY and SEGWAY & Design for
motorized personal mobility devices, on the other hand.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 1367.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018)).
Id.
Id. at 1370 (emphasis added) (citing § 1127).
Id. at 1372.
Id.
Id.
Id.
934 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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Segway, Inc. (“Segway”) offers motorized personal mobility devices
under the registered trademarks SEGWAY and SEGWAY & Design.
Segway filed two complaints with the ITC against Swagway, LLC
(“Swagway”), which offered self-balancing hoverboard products under
the marks SWAGWAY X1 and X2 and SWAGTRON T1 and T3.26
Segway alleged Swagway’s marks infringed its SEGWAY trademarks,
among other things.27 The ITC instituted an investigation based on the
complaints, consolidated them, and assigned the matter to an
administrative law judge (ALJ).28
Swagway moved for partial termination of the investigation
regarding the trademark infringement allegations on the basis of a
consent order stipulation, which stipulated, among other things, that
Swagway would not sell or import “SWAGWAY-branded personal
transporter products as well as all components thereof, packaging and
manuals therefor.”29 Segway opposed the stipulation and proposed
consent order based on the fact that it addressed only a subset of the
claims and products at issue in the investigation, and it would allow
Swagway to relitigate issues concerning trademarks covered by that
order.30 During a hearing in the consolidated investigation, the ALJ
advised that the pending motion for consent order would not be ruled
on before the end of the hearing.31
The ALJ issued a Final Initial Determination finding, among other
things, that Swagway’s use of SWAGWAY, but not its use of SWAGTRON,
infringed Segway’s trademarks. This determination was based on an
analysis of six likelihood of confusion factors: (1) evidence of actual
consumer confusion; (2) the degree of similarity in appearance and
pronunciation between the marks; (3) Swagway’s intent in adopting the
marks; (4) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the
products; (5) the degree of care exercised by consumers; and (6) the
strength of the mark.32
First, the ALJ found “overwhelming evidence” of actual confusion
existed between the SWAGWAY and SEGWAY marks but only de

26. Id. at 1336.
27. Id. at 1335 (noting that Segway also filed six allegations of patent infringement
that were not at issue in this appeal).
28. Id. at 1336.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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minimis actual confusion between the SWAGTRON and SEGWAY
marks.33 Second, the ALJ stated the SWAGWAY and SEGWAY marks
looked alike and had similar pronunciations, but the SWAGTRON and
SEGWAY marks did not.34 Third, the ALJ found Swagway’s founder did
not intend to infringe Segway’s marks because he had independently
derived the SWAGWAY mark and then changed the designation to
SWAGTRON after Segway’s counsel sent him a cease-and-desist
letter.35 Fourth, the ALJ found that Segway’s and Swagway’s products
were sold through the same websites and stores, but that the SEGWAY
products were significantly more expensive than the SWAGWAY and
SWAGTRON products, which weighed against a likelihood of
consumer confusion.36 The ALJ did not make a finding as to the degree
of care exercised by consumers because neither party presented
evidence as to that factor.37 Finally, the ALJ found that the SEGWAY
marks were commercially and conceptually strong because SEGWAY is
a coined term and has strong brand recognition.38 The ALJ thus
concluded that the SWAGWAY marks infringed Segway’s trademarks,
but the SWAGTRON marks did not.39 The ALJ’s Final Initial
Determination did not mention specifically Swagway’s motion for
termination based on the consent order stipulation but stated in a
footnote that “[a]ny pending motion that has not been adjudicated is
denied, unless otherwise noted.”40
Swagway filed a petition for review of the Determination. Swagway
appealed the denial of its consent order and the finding that the
SWAGWAY mark infringed the SEGWAY trademarks.41 The ITC
reversed the ALJ’s finding on actual confusion, noting that compared
to the volume of sales of SWAGWAY products, the incidents of actual
confusion were minimal and at least some of the proffered evidence
was unreliable.42 The Commission stated that the lack of actual
confusion “d[id] not weigh in favor of [a finding of a] likelihood of

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 1336–37.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
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confusion.”43 However, the ITC affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that a
likelihood of confusion existed between the SEGWAY and SWAGWAY
marks based on the remaining likelihood of confusion factors
considered by the ALJ.44 The ITC determined it would not review the
ALJ’s denial of Swagway’s consent order motion.45
Swagway appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the
Commission did not give sufficient weight to the fact that there was no
evidence of actual confusion, and the parties had coexisted for a
substantial period of time.46 Swagway also challenged the ITC’s failure
to enter the proposed consent order.47
The Federal Circuit noted that evidence of concurrent use weighs
against a likelihood of confusion but must be balanced against the
other evidence in the record.48 Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted,
Swagway had not argued on appeal that its evidence warranted a
finding of long-term, concurrent use of the marks in the same trade
channels to support its argument that a lack of actual confusion
weighed against a likelihood of confusion.49
The Federal Circuit rejected Swagway’s argument that the ITC failed
to properly reweigh the likelihood of confusion factors after reversing
the ALJ’s determination with regard to actual confusion.50 The Federal
Circuit noted that it is appropriate to give certain factors different
weights under different circumstances.51 In this case, the Federal
Circuit held the ITC properly gave strong weight to the strength of the
SEGWAY marks and the similarity of the marks.52
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that Segway’s failure to submit a
survey did not require the Commission to apply an adverse inference
that such a survey would not have shown a likelihood of confusion
between the marks.53 The Federal Circuit noted that it had previously
declined to apply an adverse inference on this basis, and thus, the
Commission did not err in according no weight to Segway’s lack of
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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survey evidence.54 The Federal Circuit accordingly affirmed the ITC’s
conclusion that Swagway infringed Segway’s trademarks.55
Regarding the consent order motion, the Federal Circuit rejected
Swagway’s arguments that the ITC’s failure to provide an express
explanation for denial of the consent order motion violated the
Administrative Procedure Act or that the denial of Swagway’s consent
order motion by footnote in the ITC’s decision entitled Swagway to
relief.56 The Federal Circuit found that the denial by footnote was no
more than harmless error.57 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the ITC’s denial of Swagway’s consent order motion.58
D. Hylete LLC v. Hybrid Athletics, LLC
In Hylete LLC v. Hybrid Athletics, LLC,59 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the TTAB’s decision that applicant Hylete’s design mark shown below
(“Hylete’s Mark”) for athletic apparel was likely to cause confusion
with opposer Hybrid Athletics’ design mark shown below (“Hybrid’s
Mark”) for athletic apparel and fitness services.60
Hylete’s Mark

Hybrid’s Mark

At the Board, Hybrid relied on its prior-filed application for Hybrid’s
Mark for “conducting fitness classes; health club services, namely,
providing instruction and equipment in the field of physical exercise;
personal fitness training services and consultancy; physical fitness

54. Id. (citing Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685
F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
55. Id. at 1344.
56. Id. at 1342.
57. Id. at 1343–44.
58. Id. at 1344.
59. 931 F.3d 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
60. Id. at 1171, 1175.
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instruction” and on common law rights from the same mark for
athletic apparel, including shirts, hats, shorts, and socks.61 Hybrid
submitted evidence of its mark on athletic apparel that showed
Hybrid’s Mark above the phrase “Hybrid Athletics” and a row of dots
as shown below (“Hybrid’s Composite Mark”).
Figure 2: Hybrid’s Composite Mark

Hylete argued before the Board that the differences between the two
designs in appearance were sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion.62
The Board disagreed, finding that both marks are stylized versions of the
letter “H” and that the marks have similar commercial impressions.63 The
Board relied only on Hybrid’s common-law rights after finding that it had
failed to establish ownership of the prior-filed application.64
Hylete filed a Request for Reconsideration of the Board’s decision,
arguing that there was no evidence that consumers would view Hylete’s
Mark as a stylized “H.”65 Hylete did not argue that the Board
erroneously analyzed Hybrid’s Mark as being a stylized “H.” The Board
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1171–72.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1172–73.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1173.
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rejected Hylete’s arguments in the Request for Reconsideration,
noting that Hylete itself had characterized its mark as a stylized letter
“H” in its briefing.66 Hylete appealed.67
On appeal, Hylete argued that the Board erred by comparing Hylete’s
Mark to Hybrid’s Mark rather than to Hybrid’s Composite Mark.68 The
Federal Circuit held that Hylete had “never contended that Hybrid’s
common law rights implicated a ‘composite common law mark’ that
differed from the stylized ‘H’ design mark identified in the [prior-filed]
application” and thus waived the issue on appeal.69 The Federal Circuit
accordingly affirmed the Board’s finding of likelihood of confusion.
II. SPECIMENS OF USE
A. In re Siny Corp.
In In re Siny Corp.,70 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision
refusing to register the mark CASALANA based on a specimen
consisting of a webpage printout.71
Siny Corp. (“Siny”) sought to register CASALANA for “[k]nit pile
fabric made with wool for use as a textile in the manufacture of
outerwear, gloves, apparel, and accessories.”72 Siny submitted a
webpage printout as the specimen.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1173–74.
Id. at 1174–75.
920 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1332.
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Figure 3: Siny Webpage

The examining attorney refused registration on the basis that the
webpage appeared to be “mere advertising material” and did not show
the mark’s use in commerce in connection with the goods because it
did not include a means for ordering the goods.73
Siny then submitted a substitute specimen showing the same webpage
but with additional text stating “‘[f]or sales information:’ followed by a
phone number and email address.”74 The examining attorney again
rejected the specimen, stating that the added text only indicated how
consumers could obtain more information necessary to make a purchase
but was insufficient for consumers to actually make a purchase.75 The
examining attorney noted that the specimen did not indicate minimum
quantities for an order, cost, payment options, or shipping information.76
Siny appealed the refusal to register to the TTAB, arguing that the
webpage was a “display associated with the goods.”77 Siny also argued

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1334–35.
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that because the goods are industrial materials used by manufacturers,
the sales transaction requires assistance from Siny’s sales personnel.78
The Board agreed with the examining attorney that the specimen
lacked information the Board considers essential to a consumer’s
purchasing decision, such as the price, minimum quantities required
for an order, and payment and shipping methods.79 The Board
rejected Siny’s argument that the fact that Siny’s sales personnel must
assist consumers means such information is not necessary, stating that
“while some details must be worked out by telephone, if virtually all
important aspects of the transaction must be determined from
information extraneous to the web page, then the web page is not a
point of sale.”80 The Board also stated that in such cases, the applicant
“would be well advised to provide the examining attorney with
additional evidence and information regarding the manner in which
purchases are actually made through the webpage.”81 In a split
decision, the Board concluded the webpage was not a “point of sale”
display and affirmed the examining attorney’s finding.82
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that the Board had carefully
considered the specimen, and substantial evidence supported its
conclusion that the specimen did not cross the line from mere
advertising to a display associated with the goods.83 The Federal Circuit
thus affirmed the Board’s decision.84
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit was relatively quiet in terms of trademark
decisions in 2019. Many of the Federal Circuit’s decisions focused on
the multi-factor likelihood of confusion test. While useful guidance for
practitioners, these cases were not groundbreaking. The Court’s
determination in In re Siny Corp. regarding what constitutes a proper
specimen of use will likely have the greatest impact on the day-to-day
practice of trademark law before the PTO.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1335.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1337.
Id.

